Abstract: We extend the class of pedestrian crowd models introduced by Lachapelle and Wolfram (2011) to allow for nonlocal crowd aversion and arbitrarily but finitely many interacting crowds. The new crowd aversion feature grants pedestrians a 'personal space' where crowding is undesirable. We derive the model from a particle picture and treat it as a mean-field type game. Solutions to the mean-field type game are characterized via a Pontryagin-type Maximum Principle. The behavior of pedestrians acting under nonlocal crowd aversion is illustrated by a numerical simulation.
Introduction
When moving in a crowd, a pedestrian chooses its path based not only on its desired final destination but it also takes the movement of other surrounding pedestrians into account. The bullet points below are stated in [18] as typical traits of pedestrian behavior.
• Will to reach specific targets. Pedestrians experience a strong interaction with the environment.
• Repulsion from other individuals. Pedestrians may agree to deviate from their preferred path, looking for free surrounding room. • Deterministic if the crowd is sparse, partially random if the crowd is dense.
These properties appear in classical particle models. Other authors advocate smart particle models that follow decision-based dynamics. In [18] some fundamental differences between classical and smart particle models are outlined. We list a few of them in Table 1 .
Classical
Smart Robust -interaction only through collisions Fragile -avoidance of collisions and obstacles Blindness -dynamics ruled by inertia Vision -dynamics ruled at least partially by decision Local -interaction is pointwise
Nonlocal -interaction at a distance Table 1 A smart particle model lets pedestrians decide blue where to walk, with what speed etc. The choice is based on some rule that takes the available information into account such as the positioning and movement of other pedestrians. Although more realistic, this approach has complications. If pedestrian i moves, all pedestrians accessing information on i's state might have to adapt their movements. The large number of connections where information is exchanged within a crowd is a computational difficulty.
The mean-field approach to modeling crowd aversion and congestion for pedestrians was introduced in [15] . The pedestrians are treated as particles following decision-based dynamics that optimize their path by avoiding densely crowded areas. Crowd aversion describes motion avoiding high density whereas congestion describes motion hindered by high density. The theory of mean-field games originates from the independent works of Lasry-Lions [16] and Huang-Caines-Malhamé [10] . The cost considered in this early work is not of congestion type, i.e. the energy penalization is independent of the density. The framework was extended to several populations on the torus in [9] and to several populations on a bounded domain with reflecting boundaries in [8] , with further studies in [1, 6] . Mean field games with a cost of congestion type was introduced by P-L. Lions in a lecture series 2011 [17] . Congestion has also been studied in the mean-field type. In [2] the finite horizon case is considered. In [3, 4] the authors prove existence and uniqueness of weak solutions characterized by an optimization approach based on duality, and propose a numerical method for mean-field type control based on this result for the case of local congestion.
Turning to the crowd aversion model of this paper, a pedestrian with position X i,N in a crowd of N pedestrians controls its velocity such that its risk measure, J i,N , is minimized over a finite time horizon [0, T ]. The risk measure penalizes proximity to others, energy waste and failure to reach a target area. In this paper we advocate for the use of the following nonlocal contribution to the risk measure, reflecting a crowd aversion behavior,
(1.1)
The 'personal space' of a typical pedestrian is modeled by the function φ r and X i,N t − X j,N t is the distance between two pedestrians at time t. The personal space has support within a ball of radius r so for positive r, (1.1) is a weighted average of the crowding within the personal space and the pedestrian is not effected by crowding outside it. Connecting to the terminology in Table 1 , the case of positive r will be referred to as nonlocal crowd aversion. In the limit r → 0 the personal space shrinks to a singleton and only pointwise crowding, that is collisions, will effect the pedestrian. This will be referred to as local crowd aversion.
In emergency situations it is often in the interest of all pedestrians to get to a certain place, such an exit. In evacuation planning and crowd management at mass gatherings, it is in the interest of the planner to control the crowd along paths and towards certain areas. Common to such situations is the conflict between attraction to said locations and repulsive interactions in the crowd. Pedestrians acting under nonlocal crowd aversion will order themselves more densely in such places compared to pedestrians acting under local crowd aversion. This effect is caused by the larger personal space, the nonlocal crowd aversion term (1.1) is an average over a bigger set hence allowing for higher densities in attractive areas. Higher densities will in turn allow for more effective emergency planning when designing for example escape routes. The numerical simulation in the end of this paper confirms this effect. The pedestrians are allowed to move freely, but the observed effect will become even more beneficial for a planner when introducing an environment for the pedestrians to interact with. In reality, crowd management is often done by the strategic placement of obstacles such as pillars and walls. Furthermore, the pedestrians acting under nonlocal crowd aversion travel at an overall lower risk than their local counterpart. This suggests that a crowd with nonlocal crowd averse behavior could potentially move at a higher velocity than its local counterpart which allows for faster and more successful evacuations.
In [15] the mean-field optimal control is characterized through a matching argument. This control is an approximate Nash equilibrium for the crowd. It is, for each pedestrian, the best response to the movement of the rest of the crowd. Furthermore, two crowds are considered where each pedestrian has crowd-specific preferences such as the target location and crowd aversion preference. The authors set up a mean-field game and show that it is equivalent to an optimal control problem. In this paper, we look at the crowd from the bird's-eye view of an evacuation planner. We seek a 'simultaneous' optimal strategy for all the pedestrians involved in the crowd through a mean-field type control approach for the single-crowd case and a mean-field type game approach for the multi-crowd case.
The contributions of this paper are the following. We identify a particle model that is approximated by mean-field model for crowd aversion proposed in [15] . This gives us insights into how the interaction between pedestrians in the crowd effects the mean-field model and reveals that the crowd of [15] has a local crowd averse behavior. Our second contribution is a relaxation of the locality of the pedestrian model by allowing for interaction between pedestrians at a distance. Each pedestrian is given a personal space where it dislikes crowding, instead of interacting with other pedestrians only through collisions. This conceptual change is realistic since pedestrians do not need to be in physical contact to interact. As discussed above, the suggested nonlocal crowd aversion model allows for the following desirable features:
• Higher densities in target areas such as exits or escape routes where the pedestrians have to choose between more crowding and not reaching the target.
• Lower risk, which implies a potential increase in pedestrian velocity allowing for faster exits and a larger flow of people, a very useful feature in the design of evacuation strategies.
Finally, we generalize the model to allow for an arbitrary number of interacting crowds. This multi-crowd scenario is treated as a mean-field type game and is linked to an optimal control problem, for which we prove a sufficient maximum principle.
The paper is organized as follows. After a short section of preliminaries, we consider the single-crowd case in Section 3. In Section 4, the multi-crowd case is studied. The results derived in Section 3 generalize to an arbitrary finite number of interacting crowds and a sufficient maximum principle that characterizes the solution is proved. An example that highlights the difference between local and nonlocal crowd aversion is solved numerically in Section 5. For the sake of clarity, all technical proofs are moved to an appendix.
Preliminaries
Given a general Polish space S, let P(S) denote the space of probability measures on B(S). For an element s ∈ S, the Dirac measure on s is an element of P(S) and will be denoted by δ s . Let P(S) be equipped with the topology of weak convergence of probability measures. A metric that induces this topology is the bounded 1-Lipschitz metric,
where L 1 is the set of real-valued functions on S bounded by 1 and with Lipschitz coefficient 1. With his metric, P(S) is a Polish space. The space of probability measures on B(S) with finite second moments will be denoted by P 2 (S),
Equipped with the topology of weak convergence of measures and convergence of second moments, P 2 (S) is a Polish space. A compatible complete metric is the square Wasserstein metric d P 2 (S) , for which the following inequalities will be useful. For all s i , s i ∈ S and for all N ∈ N,
For random variables X and X with distributions ν and ν,
Let T > 0 be a finite time horizon and let R d , d ∈ N, be equipped with the Euclidean norm. Let M and M 2 be the spaces of continuous functions on [0, T ] with values in P(R d ) and
Equipped with the uniform metrics Let A be a compact subset of R d . Given a filtered probability space (Ω, F, F, P), denote by A the set of A-valued F-adapted processes such that
An element of A will be called an admissible control. From the context, it will be clear which stochastic basis the notation A is referring to.
Given a vector x = (x 1 , . . . , x N ) in the product space S N and an element y ∈ S, we let
Furthermore, the law of any random quantity X will be denoted by L(X) and any index set of the form {1, . . . , N } will be denoted by
3. Single-crowd model for crowd aversion 3.1. The particle picture
Let (Ω N , F N , F N , P N ) be a complete filtered probability space for each N ∈ N. The filtration F N is right-continuous and augmented with P N -null sets. It carries the independent ddimensional
, the F N 0 -measurable R d -valued random variable ξ i,N be square-integrable and independent of (W 1,N , . . . , W N,N ). Given a vector of admissible controls,ā N = (a 1,N , . . . , a N,N ) ∈ A N , consider the system
Under these assumptions, (3.1) has a unique strong solution in the sense that
Furthermore, the strong solution
and for some positive constant K t depending only on t.
Proof. A proof can be found in [24, Chapter 1, Theorem 6.16]. Note that K t is independent of a i,N by compactness of A.
The process X i,N models the motion of an individual in a crowd of N pedestrians, from now on called an N -crowd, who partially controls its velocity through the control a i,N . Since its control is adapted to the full filtration F N , the model allows for the pedestrian to take every movement in the crowd into account. Its motion is also influenced by external forces, such as the random disturbance driven by W i,N . The motion of the pedestrian may be modeled more generally than above by introducing an explicit weak interaction in the drift [10] , such as
It is also possible to let a common disturbance effect all pedestrians [13] , to model for example evacuations during an earthquake, a fire, a tsunami etc.
Individual i evaluates the state of the N -crowd, given by the control vectorā N = (a 1,N , . . . , a N,N ), according to its measure of risk
where
is the empirical measure of X −i,N . The region where crowding has an influence on the pedestrian's choice of control, its 'personal space', is ideally modeled by a normalized indicator function,
where B r ⊂ R d is the ball with radius r > 0 centered at the origin and Vol(B r ) is its volume. The term
then represents the number of pedestrians around X i,N t within a distance less than r at time t [22] . To simplify the calculations we will use a smoothed version of I r . Let γ δ be a mollifier, γ δ (x) := γ(x/δ)/δ, where γ is a smooth symmetric probability density with compact support. For a fixed δ > 0, we set φ r (x) := γ δ * I r (x). (3.9)
For convergence estimates later in this section, we assume that the final cost Ψ satisfies the following condition.
(A3) For all x 1 , x 2 ∈ R d there exists a constant K > 0 independent of (x 1 , x 2 ) such that
The interpretation of the risk measure is the following. The first term penalizes energy usage whereas the second term penalizes paths through densely crowded areas. The final cost penalizes deviations from specific target regions. Typically the final cost takes large values everywhere except in areas where the pedestrians want to end up, places like meeting points, evacuation doors, etc.
The mean-field type control problem
Let (Ω, F, F, P) be a complete filtered probability space such that the filtration is right continuous and augmented with P-null sets. Let F carry a Wiener process W and let ξ be an F 0 -measurable and square-integrable R d -valued random variable independent of W . Given a control a ∈ A, the mean-field type dynamics is
By Proposition 3.1 there exists a unique strong solution to (3.10). The mean-field type risk measure is given by
where µ Xt is the distribution of X t . Remark 3.1. The difference between a mean-field type control and a mean-field game is that in general mean-field games can be reduced to a standard control problem and an equilibrium while a mean-field type control problem is a nonstandard control problem [5, 7] . The matching procedure to find the fixed point (equilibrium) for a mean-field game is pedagogically described as follows [10, 16] .
(ii) Solve the stochastic control problem
where X is the dynamics corresponding to a.
X is the dynamics corresponding to the optimal controlâ.
In the mean-field type control setting, the measure-valued process (µ Xt ; t ∈ [0, T ]) is not considered to be a separate variable but given by the input control process.
Convergence of the state process
Let the initial data ξ 1,N , . . . , ξ N,N satisfy the following assumptions,
Under (B1)-(B3) the sequence (ξ i,N ) N ∈N is tight and a subsequence can be extracted that converges in distribution to a µ 0 -distributed random variable, from now on denoted by ξ. We make the following assumption about the controls.
(B4) The controls are of feedback form, a i,N t (ω) = a N (t, X i,N t (ω)), where each a N is an Avalued deterministic function and a N converge uniformly to a as N → ∞. Furthermore,
Remark 3.2. Assumption (B4) implies that, while the paths of pedestrians in the N -crowd may differ, they are outcomes from a symmetric joint probability distribution. By exchangeability of (
for all permutations π of [[N ]], the interpretation is that we cannot distinguish between pedestrians in the crowd. The pedestrians are anonymous.
Proof. The empirical measures are elements of M 2 by Proposition 3.1 together with (B1) and (B2). The proof of tightness in the case of uncontrolled diffusions is found in [19] . The introduction of a control does not change the situation.
Recall that a sequence {X n } of random variables converges weakly to X in a Polish space if and only if {X n } is tight and every convergent subsequence of {X n } converges to X. The tightness of the empirical measures implies that along a converging subsequence, µ N converges weakly to the measure-valued process µ that for all f ∈ C 2 b (R d ) satisfies
Since the strong solution of (3.10) is unique, the weak solution is also unique [23] which is equivalent to uniqueness of solutions to (3.15) [12] . We have the following result. Theorem 3.1. Let X i , i ∈ N, be independent copies of the strong solution of (3.10). Under assumptions (A1)-(B4), X i,N converges weakly to X i as N → ∞.
Proof. Applying Sznitman's propagation of chaos theorem [21] , the result follows by the weak convergence of µ N to the deterministic measure µ.
Convergence of the risk measure
From the previous section we know that X i,N , the strong solution of (3.1), converges weakly to X, the strong solution of (3.10), and we know that µ N t converges weakly to µ Xt . Applying (2.3), we have that
converges weakly to µ Xt as well. By Skorokhod's Representation Theorem [11, Theorem 3 .30] we can represent (up to distribution) all the random variables mentioned above in a common probability space ( Ω, F, P) where they converge P-almost surely. This allows us to write
By compactness of A, the Continuous Mapping Theorem, (B4) and Dominated Convergence we have
By (A3), Proposition 3.1 and Dominated Convergence,
As N → ∞, the first term on the right hand side tends to zero by the definition of weak convergence while the second tends to zero by the Continuous Mapping Theorem and Dominated Convergence. We have proved the following result. The notion of solutions of the the N -crowd model (N-1) and the mean-field type control problem (MFT-1) for crowd aversion will now be defined. Solution to N-1) . Letâ N = (â, . . . ,â) ∈ A N for some fixedâ ∈ A and let a N = (a, . . . , a) ∈ A N for an arbitrary strategy a ∈ A. Thenâ N is a solution to N-1 if
If, for a given ε > 0,â satisfies 20) thenâ N is an ε-solution to N-1.
Definition 3.2 (Solution to MFT-1). Ifâ ∈ A satisfies
thenâ is a solution to MFT-1.
The following result motivates the use of MFT-1 as an approximation to N-1. It confirms that we can construct an approximate solution to N-1 using a solution to MFT-1. Proof. The proof follows straight away by Theorem 3.2.
Remark 3.3. It is known that the solution of a mean-field game corresponds to an approximate Nash equilibrium for N-1 ([10], [16] ). To the best of our knowledge, this has not been shown to be true for solutions to mean-field type control problems. Theorem 3.3 has the following interpretation; a mean-field type optimal control induces an approximate solution for the Ncrowd if the crowd consists homogeneous pedestrians and thus a representative pedestrian determines the control of all. This was in fact visible already in Theorem 3.2.
Deterministic version of MFT-1
We want to present results in a setting similar to [15] to highlight the differences between the models. To do this, we make the assumption that µ Xt has a density m X (t, ·) for all t ∈ [0, T ]. An example of sufficient conditions for the existence is bounded drift and diffusion [19] . Under this assumption, we may rewrite (3.10)-(3.11) into a deterministic problem for m X . Furthermore, an admissible control can not be stochastic in the deterministic problem formulation. The full stochastic problem will be analyzed in future work. We have a new definition of an admissible control. By (3.15) the density m X satisfies
for all f ∈ C 2 b (R d ) and for all t ∈ [0, T ], hence it is a weak solution to
We arrive to a deterministic version of MFT-1 (dMFT-1),
Remark 3.4. Note that φ r converges weakly to δ 0 as r → 0. In this limit, the risk measure tends to
which is exactly the risk analyzed in the pedestrian crowd model of [15] ! Clearly this case corresponds to a situation where the pedestrian will only react to how likely it is to 'bump' into other pedestrians. In the case of positive r, a pedestrian is effected by crowding within a personal space of nonzero range and reacts to the level of the density within this range. This is the distinction between local and nonlocal crowd averse behavior.
Multi-crowd model for crowd aversion

The particle picture
In this section, crowd averse behavior between several crowds is introduced. The crowds are allowed to differ in their opinions on target areas and/or the level of crowd aversion. This inhomogeneity is introduced in the risk measure. Let the setup be as in the previous chapter, except now
,N independent of all the Wiener processes. Given N M admissible controls a i,j,N , consider the system dX
(4.1)
In view of Proposition 3.1 there exists a unique strong solution to (4.1). Pedestrian i in crowd j evaluates a according to its individual risk measure
λ jk are bounded and non-negative real numbers and Λ = (λ jk ) jk . The weights λ jk quantify the crowd aversion preferences in the model. If λ jk is high, pedestrians in crowd j pay a high price for being close to pedestrians in crowd k. If λ jk is zero, pedestrians in crowd j are indifferent to the positioning of pedestrians in crowd k. Note that if λ jk = 1 for j = k and 0 otherwise, the crowds are disconnected in the sense that there is no interaction between pedestrians from different crowds.
The mean-field type model
Again the setup be as before except that F now carries M independent F-Wiener processes
, and there are M square-integrable
, independent of all the Wiener processes. Given a vector of admissible controls a M = (a 1 , . . . , a M the mean-field type dynamics are
There exists a unique strong solution to (4.4) by Proposition 3.1. The mean-field type risk measure for crowd j ∈ [[M ]] is given by 
Solutions of N-M and MFT-M
The convergence results for the single-crowd case generalizes to multiple crowds under the following assumptions.
(C4) The controls are of feedback form, a i,j,N t (ω) = a j,N (t, X i,j,N t (ω)) where each a j,N is a deterministic A-valued function and a j,N converge uniformly to a j as N → ∞. Furthermore, 
Definition 4.1 (Solution to N-M). For any
a j ∈ A, let (a j ) N = (a j , . . . , a j ) ∈ A N . The control vector ((â 1 ) N , . . . , (â M ) N ) is a solution to N-M if J i,j,N r,Λ ((â 1 ) N , . . . , (â M ) N ) ≤ J i,j,N r,Λ ((a j ) N , (â −j ) N ), ∀ a j ∈ A, ∀ j ∈ [[M ]]. (4.7) If J i,j,N r,Λ ((â 1 ) N , . . . , (â M ) N ) ≤ J i,j,N r,Λ ((a j ) N , (â −j ) N ) + ε, ∀ a j ∈ A, ∀ j ∈ [[M ]] (4.8) for ε > 0, ((â 1 ) N , . . . , (â M ) N ) is an ε-solution to MFT-M.
Definition 4.2 (Solution to MFT-M). The vectorâ
Remark 4.1. There is a fundamental difference between the definition of solutions in the single-crowd case and in the multi-crowd case. The latter is a Nash equilibrium while the former is an optimal control. So, what has changed? We still have anonymity between pedestrians within a crowd but the vector of all controls used in the multi-crowd case, ((a j,N (t,
for N-M and (a j (t, X j t )) M j=1 for MFT-M, is not exchangeable (cf. (3.14) ). From our point of view, we may distinguish between two pedestrians from different crowds and hence the pedestrians are not anonymous anymore. Thus, it makes sense to look at a game problem between the crowds.
The approximation result Theorem 3.3 generalizes to the multi-crowd case. Proof. The proof follows exactly the same steps as the proof of Theorem 3.3.
Finally, under the assumption that µ X j t admits a density m X j (t, ·), we rewrite MFT-M into a deterministic problem (dMFT-M).
Definition 4.3 (Solution to dMFT-M). A control vectorâ
and m j solves
(4.12)
Remark 4.2. In the limit r → 0 the risk measure is
The interpretation is the same as in the single-crowd model, when r → 0 the personal space of the pedestrians shrink to a singleton and only collisions have an impact on the choice of control. Note that (4.13) with parameters M = 2, λ 11 = λ 22 = 1 and λ 12 = λ 21 = λ is exactly the cost that appears in [15] .
An optimal control problem equivalent to dMFT-M
In this section an optimal control problem is introduced. It is shown to have the same solution as dMFT-M, so instead of solving the game problem an optimal control is characterized by a Pontryagin-type Maximum Principle. To ease notation, let ϕ = (ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ M ) for ϕ ∈ {Ψ(x), m(t, x), |a(t, x)| 2 }. Consider the following optimization problem,
The following proposition is the first link between dMFT-M and (OC). Proof. The proof is found in Appendix 6.1.
The condition Λ =Λ +Λ T − diag(Λ) forces Λ to be symmetric and the interpretation is that the aversion between crowds must be symmetric, i.e. if a crowd is averse to another, the other one must be equally averse towards the first. One can of course consider other situations, but then it is not possible to rewrite the game into an optimization problem on the form of (OC).
Therefore from now Λ is assumed to satisfy the condition of Proposition 4.1. Note thatΛ does not necessarily have to be symmetric. Towards a characterization of the optimal control, let 16) and let, with some abuse of notation, 18) and let p solve the adjoint equation 
Proof. Let a,â ∈ A M d and let a := a+(1− )â, ∈ (0, 1). Let m andm satisfy the constraints of (OC) with a andâ respectively, then η := m −m solves
is a remainder that will cancel out in the end.
Let ϕ (t, x, p) := ϕ(t, x, a , m , p) for ϕ ∈ {f, g, H} and defineφ in the same way usingâ. Note that
and by symmetry of φ n ,
By the convexity assumption on H,
By a variation argument, the m-derivative ofĤ is found to be
The a-derivatives ofĤ vanish by the optimality condition (4.21). Hence, using (4.24),
Applying the adjoint equation (4.19) now gives J r,Λ (a ) − J r,Λ (â) ≥ 0 for all convex perturbations a ofâ. In the case of a control sets A which is not convex the proof can be carried out in similar fashion by replacing the convex perturbation a by a spike variation.
Note that ifâ Proof. The convexity of H in a is trivial. H is convex in m if
The inequality above can be rearranged into Proof. The proof is found in Appendix 6.2.
The local risk measure, introduced in Remark 4.2, will naturally yield a different Hamiltonian and adjoint equation than the ones above. Anyhow, results analogous to Proposition 4.1, Theorem 4.2 and Proposition 4.3 hold for the local case, and their proofs are carried out following the same steps as in the nonlocal case. The most notable structural change is that in the local case, H is convex if and only ifΛ is positive semidefinite.
Numerical example
With the following numerical example we want to illustrate the difference local nonlocal crowd aversion. We consider the following simple pedestrian model on the one-dimensional torus T,
To make the comparison we also consider the corresponding local crowd aversion problem
The constraint in (5.1) and (5.2) corresponds to the dynamics of a pedestrian that controls its velocity but is disturbed by white noise,
The constant C has been introduced to reweight the contribution of crowd aversion. By upweighting this term, emphasis is given to the impact of the preference, local or nonlocal, and the difference between the two crowds will be more clear. To solve (5.1) and (5.2) the gradient decent method (GDM) of [15] is used.
Simulations and discussions
We let T = 1, C = 500 and m 0 and φ r are set to the functions presented in Figure 5 .1. Most pedestrians are initially gathered around x = 0 and they have an incentive to end up around x = 0.5 at time t = 1. The personal space of a pedestrian is modeled aŝ
In the calculations,φ 0.2 is smoothed with a mollifier (cf. (3.9) ). Note that
The use of an indicator to model the personal space thus has the following interpretation; the pedestrian acting under nonlocal crowd aversion is affected by the probability of other pedestrians being closer than 0.2 from its own position. The averaging effect of a nonlocal crowd aversion model is clear: the larger the personal space, the bigger neighborhood around the pedestrian is affecting it.
The optimal controls for (5.1) and (5.2) are found by the GDM-scheme of [15] . The convergence of the risk is presented in Figure 5 .1. In Figure 5 .1, a comparison between the solutions of (5.1) and (5.2) is displayed. The crowds behave similarly until time begins to approach t = 1. The crowd acting under nonlocal crowd aversion then gathers more densely in the low cost area. Since the crowding experienced by a pedestrian in the nonlocal model is an average over a larger neighborhood, it cares less about pointwise high densities and the benefits of reaching the low cost area around x = 0.5 has a stronger impact in the nonlocal model, resulting in a more concentrated density. This is visualized in Figure 5 .1, where on the left the difference between crowd aversion penalties, The initial density and terminal cost used in the simulations. Initially the pedestrians are crowded around x = 0 but they will quickly flatten the density to heed their crowd aversion preferences. The low cost around x = 0.5 will give the pedestrians an incentive to end up around this part of the domain at t = 1. where h 0 j is the solution of (6.6) in the limit → 0. Recall that Λ = − ∇ · D a j b(t, x,â j (t, x))w j (t, x)m j (t, x) p j (t, x)dtdx.
(6.9)
Inserting (6.9) into (6.8) yields 
